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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
The corporate insolvency landscape is changing. While the numbers of formal 
insolvency appointments have not increased dramatically since the Global Financial 
Crisis,1 the dialogue surrounding financial distress and the methods to address it has 
moved away from formal insolvency appointments to restructuring and turnaround 
before financial distress becomes insolvency.2 Insolvency proceedings, such as 
receivership, liquidation and even voluntary administration (which has a stated purpose 
of trying to save businesses)3 carry a stigma of failure,4 which makes trading on as a 
business more difficult and reduces creditor confidence in the potential to save the 
business through a formal restructuring.  
Schemes of arrangement have been used to restructure companies for more than 
160 years.5 A scheme may be used by creditors to address financial distress, and offers 
numerous advantages over other formal mechanisms (such as liquidation and voluntary 
administration) because it applies to secured creditors6 and can be used to bind dissenting 
minorities of both secured and unsecured creditors.7  
The ability to bind minorities within a specific class of creditors or members is 
sometimes referred to as a ‘cram down’. A creditors’ scheme of arrangement may be 
proposed between a company and one or more classes of creditors. Where the scheme 
targets multiple classes of creditors it must be approved by a majority of each class. If 
one class of creditors dissents, then the scheme fails. The ability of a majority of creditor 
classes to bind one or more dissenting classes is referred to as ‘cross-class cram down’ 
and is the focus of this article.  
Creditors’ schemes of arrangements are often criticised as being slow, costly, and 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor, UTS Faculty of Law. The author thanks the two anonymous 
referees for their helpful suggestions. An earlier version of this article was presented to the 2016 
BFSLA academic committee research colloquium. The author thanks the participants and the 
members of the BFSLA for their comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are the sole 
responsibility of the author.  
1  See further <http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-
document/statistics/insolvency-statistics/ >.  
2  See ARITA, A Platform for Recovery, 2014 (available from <www.arita.com.au>); 
Economics References Committee, Senate, Performance of the ASIC (2014) Rec 61; Productivity 
Commission, ‘Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure’ (Report No 75, 30 September 2015) Ch 13, 
14.  
3  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 435A.  
4  Productivity Commission, ‘Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure’ (Report No 75, 30 
September 2015) Ch 13 (in particular Finding 13.1). 
5  Colin Anderson, ‘Finding the Background of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Law’ (1999) 
10 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 107; Jennifer Payne, Schemes of Arrangement: Theory, 
Structure and Operation (2014) [1.2]. 
6  See for example Re Nine Entertainment Group Ltd [2012] FCA 1464; (2012) 211 FCR 
439. 
7  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(4).  
 Class Warfare in Debt Restructuring  
 
 
 
cumbersome. One of the issues that presents difficulties for using schemes for 
restructuring is the requirement to compose separate classes of creditors, and the need 
to obtain approval from each class, which may create opportunities for greenmailing8 
lenders which can result in value leakage to subordinate creditors. This contrasts with 
the cross-class ‘cram down’ mechanism in the United States that allows for a court order 
to bind dissenting classes to a restructuring plan. Cram down mechanisms have been 
introduced or proposed in several jurisdictions in recent years, including Singapore and 
England. This article argues that Australian scheme laws would benefit from a cross-
class cram down mechanism to facilitate debt restructuring. 
The current law requires creditors to be put into separate classes for voting, in 
certain circumstances, as discussed below in Part IV. The potential for class hold outs 
can allow specific creditors to engage in greenmailing by threatening to vote against the 
scheme in the hope of a better deal for themselves by receiving a payment or equity stake 
in the restructured entity. In response, the scheme proponent may seek to establish that 
the enterprise value puts the dissenting class underwater,9 at least on a liquidation 
analysis, which may lead to complex arguments in scheme litigation concerning the 
appropriate enterprise value and where the break in the capital structure is.10 The 
greenmailing potential of junior class hold-outs can also result in value leakage from 
senior lenders to junior creditors and encourage debt traders to buy into strategic stakes 
to hold senior lenders hostage in order to extract value from the restructuring, perhaps 
at the risk of inhibiting the restructuring if further value is not provided. While some 
may argue that this is simply the operation of the market for corporate debt, if it 
entrenches inefficiencies and increases costs and delays it may result in viable businesses 
not being able to restructure using a scheme and the business potentially failing.  
This article will argue that these complexities, which reduce the efficiency of 
creditors’ schemes as a debt restructuring tool, could be addressed by introducing a 
cross-class cram down mechanism into Australian law. A cross-class cram down 
mechanism would allow the court to address rent-seeking behaviour,11 which is often 
seen in debt trading around restructuring efforts, while still upholding the majority views 
of the creditors. Furthermore, introducing such a cram down mechanism would bring 
Australian creditors’ schemes into line with restructuring tools in other major 
jurisdictions such as the US, several European countries, China, Japan and, most 
recently, Singapore. Australia is in a global competition for restructuring capital, and 
providing an effective and efficient restructuring procedure will make Australia a more 
attractive forum in which to pursue restructuring.  
Part II of this article explains the role and benefits of debt restructuring using 
                                                 
8  Greenmailing refers to the practice of acquiring a strategic stake in a company’s debt or 
equity with the goal of pressuring the majority holder to acquire the stake at more than market 
value. For a discussion of greenmailing see generally: Re Elders Australia Ltd; Super John Pty 
Ltd v Futuris Rural Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1377. 
9  A tier in the company’s capital structure is said to be underwater where it has no 
economic value on a liquidation analysis because the company’s assets are insufficient to pay all 
debts and the priority contest between classes of creditors (both secured and unsecured) will leave 
that class with a nil return. 
10  The phrase ‘break in the capital structure’ refers to the layer of the capital structure (that 
is the layers of debt and equity in a company) where there will be an inability to pay in full. If the 
break occurs in the mezzanine debt that means that holders of mezzanine debt (usually in the form 
of notes) will not be paid in full.  
11  Rent-seeking is an economic term that refers to a person seeking to extract economic 
returns in excess of their own deployment of capital or personal exertion. Its colloquial use refers 
to seeking unjustified economic returns. See generally, Anne Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of 
the Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 American Economic Review 291. 
   
 
 
creditors’ schemes of arrangement. Part III considers the operation and scope of 
creditors’ schemes. Part IV examines class composition in creditors’ schemes. Parts V 
and VI argue for the introduction of a cross-class cram down mechanism into Australian 
law as a way of facilitating debt restructuring and corporate rescue. Part VII concludes 
the article. 
In order to understand the value that effective creditors’ schemes can play as a 
formal restructuring tool it is important that we clarify, in brief, what debt restructuring 
is. 
 
 
II   DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
 
A   What is debt restructuring? 
 
When viable businesses get into financial distress their management and advisors 
will look for restructuring mechanisms that can address their financial difficulties while 
allowing the business to continue operating so that the value of the entire enterprise can 
be maximized. The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) offers a range of formal restructuring 
tools,12 including voluntary administration followed by a deed of company 
arrangement;13 liquidator compromises with creditors;14 and creditors’ schemes of 
arrangement.15 Each of these statutory tools addresses classes of creditors differently.16  
Voluntary administration does not distinguish between different creditor classes 
for voting purposes,17 although secured creditors maintain their enforcement rights and 
usually abstain from voting on a deed proposal, so as to preserve those rights.18 
Liquidator compromises cannot restrict secured creditor rights19 and in some cases 
(applying s477(1)(c) of the Corporations Act) cannot bind dissenting unsecured 
creditors.20 
The inability to restrict or remove enforcement rights of secured creditors is a major 
limitation on voluntary administration as a tool to restructure large businesses that often 
                                                 
12  It is important to distinguish informal restructuring, otherwise known as a workout, 
which is based on contractual consent with creditors and relies on no formal appointment under 
the Corporations Act. 
13  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Pt 5.3A. 
14  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477(1)(c) (for court liquidations); s 510 (for voluntary 
liquidations). 
15  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411. 
16  For a discussion of the meaning of the term creditor under different provisions see: 
William Koeck and Ian Ramsay, ‘The Importance of Distinguishing Between Different Categories 
of Creditors for the Purposes of Company Law’ (1994) 12 Company & Securities Law Journal 
105. 
17  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11, [30]; (2010) 240 CLR 
509; DSG Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Helenic Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 96; (2014) 86 NSWLR 
293. 
18  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 444D; Australian Gypsum Industries Pty Ltd v Dalesun 
Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] WASCA 95; (2015) 106 ACSR 79; Re Bluenergy Group Ltd (subject to 
DOCA) (Admin Appt) [2015] NSWSC 977; (2015) 107 ACSR 373. 
19  This is because liquidator powers only cover the ‘property of the company’ (see 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 477) and therefore do not cover a creditor’s rights in rem. 
20  Re Switch Telecommunications Pty Ltd (in liq); Ex parte Sherman [2000] NSWSC 794; 
(2000) 35 ACSR 172.  
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have several classes of secured debt at varying levels of priority (such as senior, junior 
and mezzanine debt)21 in addition to groups of unsecured creditors.22  
Schemes of arrangement can be used to bind one or more dissenting secured 
creditors, which is a significant advantage over voluntary administration and liquidator 
compromises, particularly where there is an attempt to recapitalize a business in financial 
distress, but a minority of secured creditors hold out. Restructuring using a scheme has 
the goal of saving all or at least some of the company’s business, thus preserving 
enterprise value, as well as jobs, supplier and customer contracts and government tax 
receipts through continued trading.  
In recent years, creditors schemes have been used to restructure several large and 
often complex businesses such as Centro, Nine Entertainment, Atlas Iron, Emeco, and 
Boart Longyear. While this indicates that schemes are clearly useful, it should be noted 
that in each of these restructurings, disputes around the composition of classes were one 
of the issues that needed extensive negotiation and court determinations. In the author’s 
view, a cross-class cram down mechanism would have made the restructuring efforts 
easier and more efficient. The lack of a cross-class cram down mechanism (compared 
with other jurisdictions such as the United States) could encourage debt traders to buy 
up strategic blocking stakes to extract further value from the scheme proponents, which 
could make restructuring more difficult to achieve and costlier to implement.  
Restructuring is a means to address financial distress in a business, rather than 
saving businesses that are fundamentally uneconomic. A business may be financially 
distressed for a variety of reasons, including poor management quality, poor cost 
controls and internal information systems, employee fraud or theft, poor economic 
trading conditions or changes in customer preferences.23 A company’s capital structure 
may need repair where it takes on too much debt compared with its current and forecast 
cash flows.24 A company’s balance sheet problems can be addressed by reducing debt 
and freeing up cash to maintain operations and provide for capital expenditure. 
Restructuring will usually involve operational changes (such as improving information 
flows and accountability, cost reductions, improving product or service offerings and 
refocusing management strategy) and financial elements (including asset sales, 
inventory and cash management, refinancing and issuing equity). This article is 
concerned with using formal legal tools to implement a financial restructuring to address 
financial distress.  
A financial restructuring (hereafter ‘restructuring’)25 may involve recapitalizing the 
business by removing levels in the capital structure that hold no economic value. Where 
the company is insolvent, and hence equity has no economic value, this can involve 
                                                 
21  For a discussion of different levels of corporate debt see King and Wood Mallesons, 
Australian Finance Law (7th ed, 2016) Part III; Geoffrey Fuller, Corporate Borrowing: Law and 
Practice (5th ed, 2016). 
22  There is a limited ability to obtain a court order limiting the rights of certain secured 
creditors, owners or lessors during a deed of company arrangement: s 444F. 
23  See further ASIC, Insolvency Statistics: Series 3.3, December 2016 Table 3.3.6 
(reporting on causes of company failure by external administrators) <http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-
resources/find-a-document/statistics/insolvency-statistics/insolvency-statistics-series-3-external-
administrator-reports/#3.3>.  
24  For a discussion of cash flows see AASB, AASB 107: Statement of Cash Flows, (August 
2015). 
25  This is sometimes called a ‘balance sheet restructuring’.  
   
 
 
removing the existing equity holders by the use of a ‘debt for equity swap’.26 Some, or 
all, of the creditors, usually secured creditors, will swap some, or all, of their debt for 
newly issued equity in the company and this will reduce the company’s existing debt 
burden and fix the balance sheet with a reduced level of debt that is usually on longer 
payment terms to give the business time to implement the operational elements of the 
restructure.  
It is also possible to restructure the business by transferring the assets to a new 
company, where the continuing secured creditors take equity in the new entity. Creditors 
who will not be participating in the restructuring, and whose claims have little value in 
liquidation are typically left behind in the existing company and then wound up. This 
can be distinguished from improper phoenix activity because the transaction is reviewed 
and sanctioned by the courts with all affected parties having the opportunity to be heard. 
One key element to restructuring financially distressed businesses is to target where 
the value breaks in the capital structure. Many companies (even small and medium 
enterprises) have multiple layers of secured debt from loans to banks covered by security 
over the entire business, to equipment finance, and debtor finance facilities.27 In large 
companies, it is common to also have bonds issued in layers (called tranches) to various 
(usually professional and institutional) investors with different levels of priority and 
interest.28 Large businesses also commonly have group loans at the most senior level in 
the capital structure (known as ‘senior secured facilities’). These may be constituted by 
a syndicated loan facility with multiple banks and institutional financiers as participants 
or may involve multiple bi-lateral facilities on similar terms (known as club loans) or a 
mixture of both.29  
When a company becomes financially distressed it is common for some of the 
secured lenders to sell their debts to distressed debt and special situation funds 
(sometimes called vulture funds) that buy up the debt at a fraction of its face value (such 
as 60c on the dollar).30 This may result in fragmentation of one or more levels of secured 
debt as original lenders (known as par lenders) sell out portions of their debt to various 
funds looking to restructure (in order to recover the par value of the debts) or to at least 
obtain a higher return than their purchase price.31 The debt traders who buy up par lender 
                                                 
26  For a discussion of debt for equity swaps see: Karl Clowry, ‘Debt-for-equity swaps’ in 
Ben Larkin (ed), Restructuring and Workouts (2nd ed, 2013) Ch 3. 
27  Debtor finance refers to invoice discounting and factoring arrangements based on the 
debtor’s receivables: see further Jamie Ng and Emanuel Poulos, ‘Chapter 4.2 Receivables 
Financing’ in Craig Wappett, Bruce Whittaker and Steve Edwards (eds) Personal Property 
Securities Law in Australia (2010). For a discussion of the varieties of corporate finance see King 
and Wood Mallesons, Australian Finance Law (7th ed, 2016) Part III. 
28  Under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the commercial term ‘bonds’ are referred to as 
either debentures (which are secured) or ‘notes’ (which are unsecured): see Ch 2L. See further 
Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay, Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (16th 
ed, 2015) Ch 19. 
29  See King and Wood Mallesons, Australian Finance Law (7th ed, 2016) Ch 11; 
LexisNexis, Australian Corporate Finance Law, Ch 3. 
30  See Adam Watterson, ‘Pulling back the shades: demystifying vulture funds’ (2016) 27 
Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 131; William Stefanidis, ‘Reviving the 
Incentive to Compromise in Corporate Restructuring: The Role of Secondary Debt Markets’ 
(2017) 28 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 135; Lionel Meehan, ‘Recent trends 
in restructurings involving distressed debt trades and “loan to own” strategies’ (2013) 14 
Insolvency Law Bulletin 27. 
31  See further Christian Pilkington, Schemes of Arrangement in Corporate Restructuring 
(2013) Ch 2.  
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debt may have very different motivations from the original par lenders, who may be 
domestic banks and institutional investors that have existing relationships with the 
corporate debtor beyond the loan facility (such as superannuation, transactional banking 
and investment banking services). Debt traders and special situation funds are often 
domiciled overseas, although an increasing number of international funds are setting up 
Australian branch offices.32  
The complexity of modern corporate debt capital structures, with multiple levels 
of secured debt, and the fragmentation of those structures (through debt trading) during 
restructuring efforts, can make it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to obtain the 
consent of all classes of secured creditors. Furthermore, some debt funds may have taken 
out a form of debt insurance known as a credit default swap which will pay out if the 
restructuring fails, which creates a strong economic incentive to hinder restructuring 
efforts in favour of liquidation.33 If these creditors can establish that a separate class is 
needed for their votes, then this gives them effective leverage to greenmail the senior 
lenders into diverting value to their level in the capital structure to ensure that all classes 
of creditors approve the scheme. Their goal may not be to try to save the business 
through a restructuring agreement, but simply to extract value by threatening the 
restructuring effort which increases costs and delays and may jeopardize the rescue of 
the business. 
 
B   The benefits of schemes for debt restructuring 
 
Schemes of arrangement offer several benefits as a corporate debt restructuring 
tool. First and foremost, schemes are extremely flexible as to how they are to affect the 
relationship between debtors and creditors. The Corporations Regulations provide for 
certain information to be provided to creditors regarding the nature of the scheme;34 there 
are no mandatory prescribed provisions that must be included within a scheme of 
arrangement, which leaves it to the company and its creditors to formulate a scheme 
proposal that will satisfy both of their essential needs. However, the requirement to have 
all creditor classes approve the scheme leaves the scheme open to hold-out classes. 
Creditors’ schemes are commonly used to impose a moratorium on claims 
enforcement and/or cancel debts and to compromise existing liabilities, but their use can 
extend to: 
 
 Amend and extend existing financing facilities;35 
 Reset loan covenants;36 
 Change the priority of creditor classes by allowing for certain debts 
(such as those provided to assist with the restructuring) to be given 
                                                 
32  See for example Oaktree and Bain Capital Credit. 
33  See further, INSOL International, Credit Derivatives in Restructuring (INSOL, 2006); 
Jeremy Green, ‘The Impact of Credit Derivatives on Corporate Debt Restructuring’ (2008) 19 
Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 97. 
34  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(3)(b); Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 
5.1.01, Sch 8. 
35  Cortefiel SA v Mep 11.S.A.R.L. [2012] EWHC 2998 (Ch); Re Stemcor (S.E.A.) Pty Ltd 
and Stemcor Trade Finance Ltd [2014] EWHC 1096. 
36  Cortefiel SA v Mep 11.S.A.R.L. [2012] EWHC 2998 (Ch). 
   
 
 
priority over existing debt classes (provided each of the affected 
classes approve of the scheme);37 
 Undertake a debt swap, debt/asset swap or a debt/equity swap;38 
 Transfer obligations to a new company (for example by way of a swap 
of existing debt, which is cancelled or diluted, for debt issued by the 
new company);39 
 Restructure stapled securities.40 
 
The ability to swap debt for equity in a company (or a new company that has 
received the debtor company’s assets through a transfer) has been particularly popular 
with distressed debt investors who can use schemes of arrangement as part of a ‘loan to 
own’ strategy to take over financially distressed businesses. Schemes provide 
exemptions from prospectus requirements under Ch 6D of the Corporations Act,41 and 
are also exempt from the 20% takeover prohibition regulation.42  
Aside from advantages for creditors pursuing a ‘loan to own’ strategy, schemes 
offer advantages for incumbent managers as they are largely a debtor in possession 
process, with management able to drive negotiations with key creditors.43  
Importantly, as the company does not need to be insolvent to use a scheme it may 
not trigger automatic termination clauses in key contracts (such as asset management 
agreements, leases and supply agreements), which will usually allow for termination 
upon the commencement of formal insolvency proceedings such as the appointment of 
a liquidator, receiver or voluntary administrator.44 These contracts may also contain a 
change of control provision that allows for review, acceleration or termination, but a 
scheme can be organized at the holding company level so that operational subsidiaries 
that have entered into service and supply contracts are not affected by a change in 
control. Indeed, the purpose of the scheme may be to transfer debt from an overleveraged 
operating subsidiary to a holding company so that the operating subsidiary is better able 
to continue trading without the threat of insolvency or loan covenant breaches. 
Secured creditors would normally constitute a separate class of creditors, although 
where a company is insolvent or close to insolvency it may be that only the secured 
lenders (or indeed only a tranche of secured lenders) will receive any distribution from 
the scheme and so the secured lenders may be a single class on their own or may be 
                                                 
37  Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch). 
38  Re Telewest Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924; Re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] 
EWHC 3800 (Ch); Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch). 
39  Re Mytravel Group Plc [2004] EWHC 2741 (Ch); Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit 
Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch); Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch). 
40  Re Centro Properties Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1465; (2011) 86 ACSR 584. 
41  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(17). Similar relief is granted for deeds of company 
arrangement arising after a period of voluntary administration: ibid s 411(17A). 
42  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 611 (item 17). 
43  A scheme administrator may be appointed under the terms of the scheme: Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(9). 
44  In Australia, there is no protection in corporate insolvency against the termination of 
executory contracts in the same manner as the US Bankruptcy Code provides in §365. There is 
however protection for personal insolvency: see Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 301. On 1 June 2017, 
the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 1) Bill 2017 (Cth) was introduced 
into Parliament with a proposal to introduce protection against ipso facto clauses for receivership, 
voluntary administration, and schemes of arrangement.   
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broken into separate classes of secured creditors (such as senior and junior secured 
classes).  
Multi-party loan facility agreements may require more than 75% approval from 
participants in the facility in order to amend the terms of the agreement. The growth in 
secondary debt trading in Australia means that it is common for there to be a 
fragmentation in the secured creditor numbers so that obtaining consent for loan facility 
variations/waivers etc. may be difficult.45 A scheme is well suited to dealing with such 
circumstances assuming that the requisite majority of 75% in value and majority in 
number can be obtained (which is still likely to be lower than approval requirements in 
syndicated loan documents).46 The ability to bind secured creditors to a scheme may 
assist in encouraging a consensual workout between the stakeholders. For example, the 
restructuring of Fitness First involved a scheme being originally proposed to address 
problematic leasing contracts held by dissenting landlords. However, the scheme was 
not proceeded with as a consensual arrangement was obtained following the threat of the 
scheme bringing home to the dissenting creditors what their likely position would be if 
a scheme was implemented. 
Schemes also offer the advantage in restructuring that they need not involve pari 
passu payment to creditors.47 Schemes may also depart from the system of priority 
payments that arise in liquidation, although the comparison for companies that are 
insolvent or likely to become insolvent will be with outcomes in a liquidation and so 
while priority may be changed, the creditors covered by the scheme should be paid at 
least as much as they would be likely to receive in the absence of a scheme (i.e. if the 
company went into liquidation). 
Schemes can also include mandated releases from scheme creditors for rights that 
they may have against third parties, provided that there is a sufficient nexus between the 
release and the relationship of debtor/creditor,48 which is not possible under a voluntary 
administration followed by a deed of company arrangement.49  
As demonstrated above, creditors’ schemes offer a range of benefits for 
implementing effective debt restructuring for companies in financial distress over other 
options in administration and liquidation. In the next Part, I examine the operation of the 
scheme provisions in the Corporations Act, as a foundation for a critical examination of 
the class composition issue in Part IV. 
 
 
III   THE OPERATION OF CREDITORS’ SCHEMES 
 
Australian schemes of arrangement are regulated by s 411 of the Corporations Act, 
which appears in Pt 5.1 of Ch 5 (External Administration). A scheme can only be used 
by a ‘Part 5.1 body’,50 which is defined as a company or a ‘registrable body’ that is 
                                                 
45  See further Pilkington, above n 31. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125, [78]; (2009) 178 FCR 563; Re Trix [1970] 3 
All ER 397; Re Austcorp Tiles Pty Ltd (1991) 10 ACLC 62; Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 
BCLC 480, [15]. 
48  Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125; (2009) 178 FCR 563. 
49  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11; (2010) 240 CLR 509; 
Jason Harris, ‘Adjusting Creditor Rights Against Third Parties During Debt Restructuring’ (2011) 
19 Insolvency Law Journal 22. 
50  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9 (definition), 411(1). 
   
 
 
registered under Divs 1 or 2 of Part 5B.2 of the Corporations Act.51 In short, schemes of 
arrangement are available for companies and bodies corporate that are registered under 
the Corporations Act.52 This is in contrast to the position in England, where schemes of 
arrangement are becoming an increasingly popular tool for foreign companies that are 
not registered in England but have finance contracts that are governed by English law or 
which select English court jurisdiction.53 
Where the jurisdiction to consider the scheme is enlivened, the scheme must also 
involve a ‘compromise or arrangement’ that is ‘between the body and its creditors or 
any class of them’.54 The term compromise has been described as involving some give 
and take where both parties make concessions and give up something.55 A compromise 
does not involve the majority forcing the minority to give a gift to them.56 A total 
surrender or confiscation of rights for nothing in return would not be a compromise.57 A 
compromise involves the resolution of some dispute about rights.58 The term 
arrangement is broader than a compromise,59 because it does not need to involve the 
resolution of a dispute between the parties,60 but still involves the concept of give and 
take by both parties.61  
The terms compromise and arrangement are to be construed liberally.62 As Lowe 
ACJ said in the often-cited decision in Re International Harvester: ‘almost any 
arrangement otherwise legal which touches or concerns the rights and obligations of the 
company or its members or creditors may be come to under [the predecessor to s 411]’.63  
Schemes therefore offer a flexible tool for restructuring businesses that can be 
shaped to the circumstances through negotiation with the major creditors, although not 
to circumvent another provision in the Corporations Act.64 
                                                 
51  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9. A company is itself defined as a ‘company registered 
under the Corporations Act’: ibid s 9. 
52  See further the explanation of the historical development of the phrase ‘Part 5.1 body’ 
in Tony Damian and Andrew Rich, Schemes, Takeovers and Himalayan Peaks (3rd ed, 2013) 
[3.1.5]. 
53  See Pilkington, above n 31, Ch 2; Payne, above n 5, Ch 7. 
54  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(1). 
55  Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co [1891] 1 Ch 213, 
228 per North J. 
56  Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co v International Co of Mexico [1893] 1 Ch 
484, 489 per Lindley LJ; Re NFU Development Trust Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 135. 
57  Re T&N Ltd [2006] EWHC 1447 (Ch), [50] per Richards J. 
58  Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co v International Co of Mexico [1893] 1 Ch 
484, 491 per Fry LJ. 
59  Re Guardian Assurance Co [1917] 1 Ch 413; Re International Harvester Co of Aust Pty 
Ltd [1953] VLR 669, 672 per Lowe ACJ.  
60  Re Guardian Assurance Co [1917] 1 Ch 413; Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] 
FCA 813; (2009) 179 FCR 20 (appeal dismissed: Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125; (2009) 
178 FCR 563). 
61  Re NFU Development Trust Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 135; Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd 
[2009] FCA 813; (2009) 179 FCR 20 (approved in Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125, [67]; 
(2009) 178 FCR 563). 
62  ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485, 501; Re 
International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 669. 
63  Re International Harvester Co of Aust Pty Ltd [1953] VLR 669, 672 per Lowe ACJ. See 
also Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125; (2009) 178 FCR 563. 
64  ASC v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd [1993] HCA 15; (1993) 177 CLR 485; Re Glendale 
Land Development (in liq) [1982] 2 NSWLR 563.  
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The scheme provisions apply to creditors, including both secured and unsecured 
creditors.65 A creditor for this purpose is one who has a pecuniary claim against the 
company, including prospective and contingent claims as well as claims in the nature of 
unliquidated damages.66 There may be particular difficulties in identifying who the 
relevant creditor is where the debt involves debentures or notes.67 It is possible that the 
creditor is the trustee who holds the instruments on behalf of investors,68 although more 
recently it has been held that the ultimate beneficial owners of bonds were the relevant 
creditors for voting purposes.69 
A person who is not a creditor may be included in the scheme provided that the 
scheme is still made between the company and its creditors, and there is a nexus between 
the third party (or rights of creditors against the third party) and the relationship of debtor 
and creditor between the company and its creditors.70 This offers a significant advantage 
over a voluntary administration followed by a deed of company arrangement, which 
cannot include creditor rights against third parties.71 
Implementation of a creditors’ scheme requires the following steps to be taken: 
 
1. Formulating the scheme and preparing the explanatory statement72 
that will be provided to creditors;73 
2. Applying to the court for permission to convene meetings of creditors 
who will be covered by the scheme, to vote on a scheme proposal. It 
is possible for a stay to be granted by the court pending the approval 
of the scheme.74 
                                                 
65  Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Co [1891] 1 Ch 213, 
237 per Lindley LJ; Isles v The Daily Newspaper [1912] HCA 18; (1912) 14 CLR 193. 
66  Re Midland Coal, Coke and Iron Co [1895] 1 Ch 267; Re Glendale Land Development 
Ltd (in liq) [1982] 2 NSWLR 563; Bond Corp Holdings Ltd v WA (1992) 7 WAR 61. The holder 
of options over shares in the company has been held to be a creditor for this purpose: Re Westgold 
Resources Ltd [2012] WASC 301. 
67  See Pilkington, above n 31, Ch 7; Jennifer Payne, above n 5, [5.2.4]. 
68  Re Dunderland Iron Ore Co Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 446 (arguably no longer good law in 
Australia: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Unilever Australia Securities Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 
152; Re Kershaw [2005] NSWSC 313; (2005) 54 ACSR 214). 
69  Re Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWSC 567, [29] (the notes were in a global form, which 
was not fully explained in the case but see Andrew McKnight, The Law of International Finance 
(2008), Ch 10, which discusses global note issues). See also Re Castle Holdco 4 Ltd [2009] EWHC 
3919 (Ch) (the bonds did state that an event of default would result in a transfer of the bonds to 
the ultimate beneficial owners if they request it); Re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 
(Ch) (bond indenture stated that bonds could be registered in names of account holders); Re Co-
Operative Bank Plc [2013] EWHC 4072 (Ch) (the notes were held by a trustee but the ultimate 
beneficiaries had the right to call for the notes to be transferred into their name). 
70  Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125, [73]; (2009) 178 FCR 563.  
71  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11; (2010) 240 CLR 509; 
Jason Harris, ‘Adjusting creditor rights against third parties during debt restructuring’ (2011) 19 
Insolvency Law Journal 22. 
72  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 412. 
73  See generally Damian and Rich, above n 52, Ch 5. 
74  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(16). Re GAE Pty Ltd [1962] VR 252; Re Boart 
Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWSC 537. An injunction pending a scheme has also been issued under 
general court rules in England (Bluecrest Mercantile BV v Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group 
[2013] EWHC 1146 (Comm)) and in at least one case in Australia (Bond Corp Holdings Ltd v WA 
   
 
 
3. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) (the 
corporate regulator) must be given prior notice of the application so 
that it can comment on the proposal and draft explanatory 
statements;75 
4. Notice must also be given to creditors of the court application so that 
they may seek leave to appear before the court;76  
5. If court approval is given, distribute the explanatory statement to 
creditors and convene a meeting(s) of the class(es) of creditors who 
will be covered by the scheme to vote on the scheme proposal 
6. Creditors must approve of the scheme proposal by a majority in 
number which must represent 75% of the value. These calculations are 
done on creditors who are voting at the meeting either in person or by 
proxy.77 It is not a requirement to obtain the approval of a majority of 
all creditors of the company or all of the creditors in the class. 
7. If the creditors approve of the proposal, seek court approval to 
implement the scheme.78 
 
If the court approves the scheme then the scheme will bind all creditors in the class 
to whom the scheme applies.79 This will include creditors who did not vote but who are 
in the same class as those who voted. There is no need for a scheme to cover all creditors 
or all classes of creditors, although it is possible for a scheme to cover all creditors.80 
The court can consider class composition issues at the first meeting, although given 
many creditors may not be present at the first meeting any problems arising from class 
composition can be finally determined at the second meeting.81 
It is not the role of the court to consider the detail of the scheme proposal to assess 
it for overall fairness at the stage of the first court hearing,82 although a court will not 
allow a creditors’ meeting to be convened to consider the scheme proposal if the scheme 
is so unfair (or illegal) that it is bound to be rejected at the second hearing.83 The NSW 
Court of Appeal has recently explained that: ‘the task of the Court at the first hearing is 
to determine whether the scheme is of such a nature and in such terms that if it obtained 
the statutory majority the Court would be likely to approve it on an unopposed 
subsequent hearing’.84 
                                                 
(1992) 7 WAR 61). It is also possible to obtain a moratorium by putting the company into a 
provisional liquidation pending the approval of the scheme.  
75  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(2). ASIC’s approach is explained in Damian and 
Rich, above n 52, 517-518. 
76  See the discussion in Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813; (2009) 179 
FCR 20 (applying Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 480). 
77  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(4). 
78  Ibid.  
79  Ibid. 
80  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 411(1). 
81  First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116, [40]-[41]; Re 
Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 813, [17]-[20]; (2009) 179 FCR 20.  
82  Re Telewest Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924 (Ch), [14] per Richards J. 
83  Re CSR Ltd [2010] FCAFC 34, [61]; (2010) 183 FCR 358 per Keane CJ and Jacobson 
J. 
84  First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116, [39]. 
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The court’s role at the second hearing is to consider:85 
 
a) Whether the terms of the statute have been complied with in 
conducting the creditor meeting(s) 
b) Whether the classes were fairly represented by those who attended the 
meeting and that the majority were acting bona fide and not oppressing 
the minority 
c) Whether the arrangement is such that an intelligent and honest person, 
if a member of the class concerned and acting within their interests, 
might reasonably approve  
 
The test is not simply whether one or more creditors have reasonable objections to the 
scheme.86 While the court will have regard to the wishes of the majority of creditors,87 
particularly where they are experienced business people with independent advisors, the 
court must still be satisfied of the fairness of the scheme proposal.88 As the Full Federal 
Court has explained, ‘schemes [must] meet the test of fairness to the body of creditors 
as a whole; the test is not fairness to a particular creditor in the peculiar circumstances 
of its case’.89 If there are concerns about how creditor claims have been assessed 
(including as to valuation issues) this is something that is appropriately dealt with at the 
second court hearing.90 If a person wishes to impugn the creditor vote on the basis of 
some collateral interest held by particular creditors in a class and not others, it must be 
shown:  
 
that an intelligent and honest member of the class without those collateral 
interests could not have voted in the way that he did. It is not sufficient simply 
to show that the collateral interest is an additional reason for voting in the 
manner in which he would otherwise have voted.91 
 
It is clear however that: ‘[t]he Court’s role is not to substitute its own assessment 
of what is reasonable for that of the creditors. They are much better judges of what is in 
the commercial interests of the class they represent than the court’.92 
The court can consider the potential effect of the scheme on third parties who are 
not themselves parties to the scheme if they have a legitimate interest in the deployment 
of the company’s assets,93 which means creditors who are not included within the 
                                                 
85  Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 864; [8]; (2009) 73 ACSR 411 per 
Finkelstein J. 
86  Re British Aviation Insurance Co Ltd [2005] EWHC 1621. 
87  Re English Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385, 409 per Lindley 
LJ (the creditors are ‘much better judges of what is to their commercial advantage than the court can 
be’). 
88  Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (No 2) [2009] FCA 864, [27]; (2009) 73 ACSR 411 
per Finkelstein J; Bacnet Pty Ltd v Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] FCAFC 36, [150]; 
(2010) 183 FCR 384. 
89  Bacnet Pty Ltd v Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) [2010] FCAFC 36, [151]; (2010) 
183 FCR 384. 
90  Re Sinclair Knight Merz Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1391, [28]. 
91  Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch), [130] per Hildyard J. 
92  Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch), [128] per Hildyard J. 
93  Re Centro Properties Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1465, [26]-[27]; (2011) 86 ACSR 584 per 
Barrett J. 
   
 
 
scheme may still have their position considered by the court in deciding whether to 
approve of the scheme. It must be remembered that parties whose legal rights are 
affected by the scheme must be included within its terms and must therefore be given a 
vote, which may therefore give rise to differential voting in respect of the scheme 
between classes of creditors and potentially between creditors and members.94   
IV   CLASS COMPOSITION ISSUES 
 
A   Overview 
 
Schemes can cover some or all creditors, as well as some or all members, including 
holders of convertible and hybrid securities. A scheme can also include a specific class 
of creditors (such as senior secured lenders in a loan syndication), or noteholders of one 
or more series of notes.95 Whatever the target group, the scheme proponents will need to 
consider whether the nature of the legal rights held by the group members are sufficiently 
similar (or not so dissimilar that they cannot vote together) so as to constitute a single 
class. If their rights are too different then multiple classes will need to be convened, and 
each class will need to approve the scheme proposal.96  
A class that does not have their rights affected by a scheme need not be included.97 
This includes situations where one or more classes of creditors may be underwater on a 
proper valuation of the assets. Business valuation is a complex topic that is beyond the 
scope of this article.98 However, in brief, a valuation may adopt a number of 
methodologies depending on the nature of the business and the availability of 
comparable transactions and businesses.99 Restructuring of listed entities provides for a 
wealth of financial and market information, while unlisted companies in markets without 
comparable transactions may be more difficult to value. For financially distressed 
companies that are likely to default on major debt obligations if the scheme fails, it may 
be appropriate to adopt a liquidation value as the appropriate measure of the company’s 
value.100 Clearly, the higher the company’s estimated value, the more likely that the 
capital structure breaks further down the priority ranking. Mezzanine debtors (such as 
note holders) may therefore push for a different valuation method that will yield a higher 
valuation in order to show that their debt still retains value and must therefore be 
included in the scheme if the scheme will affect their rights.101  
                                                 
94  Members’ interests would be disregarded if the company were insolvent: Re Tea Corp 
Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. Also, members with claims as creditors may be subject to subordination under 
s 563A (depending on the nature of their claim. Subordinated claim holders are not permitted to 
vote: s 411(5A). See also Re Atlas Iron Ltd [2016] FCA 366; (2016) 112 ACSR 554.  
95  See further LexisNexis, above n 29, Ch 3 and Ch 5. 
96  For a critical review of English and New Zealand law see Michael Josling, ‘An Analysis 
of the Rights Test in Determining Classes of Creditors’ (2010) 18 Insolvency Law Journal 110. 
For further discussion of the Australian law see: Damian and Rich, above n 52, Ch 6. 
97  Re Tea Corp Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12; Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] EWHC 2114 (Ch). See also 
Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813; (2009) 179 FCR 20; Re Centro Properties Ltd 
[2011] NSWSC 1171; (2011) 87 ACSR 131. 
98  See further Robert Stark, Howard Siegel, and Edward Weisfelner, Contested Valuation 
in Corporate Bankruptcy (2011).   
99  For an overview of different valuation methodologies in corporate restructuring see 
Howard and Hedger, Restructuring Law and Practice (2nd ed, 2014) Ch 5; Christopher Sontchi, 
‘Valuations Methodologies: A Judge’s View’ (2012) 20 American Bankruptcy Institute Law 
Review 1. 
100  For a recent application of this see Re Nexus Energy Ltd (subject to DOCA) [2014] 
NSWSC 1910; (2014) 105 ACSR 246. 
101  This occurred in Re Bluebrook Ltd [2010] EWHC 2114 (Ch). 
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Creditors’ schemes will often need to be separated into different voting classes, 
which is explained in the next section. It is important to note however that where multiple 
classes are established, the requisite majority votes will need to be obtained from each 
of the classes. Dissenting creditors have an incentive to push for their claims to be placed 
into a separate class so that they have a better chance of rejecting the scheme compared 
with the situation where they form part of a larger class dominated by those who support 
the scheme.  
A cross-class cram down mechanism would address this greenmail by giving 
scheme proponents the potential to obtain court sanction for the scheme despite a 
minority of creditors voting against it. While it is arguable that greenmailing provides a 
counter-balance to the voting power of the majority lenders, that counter-balance is also 
provided through the role of the two court hearings and the power of the court to refuse 
to approve the scheme where it is unfair to the creditors as a whole. Furthermore, the 
need for careful class composition can delay a scheme proposal before making the initial 
court application which may put the company at risk of individual creditor enforcement 
action.  
 
B   The class composition test 
 
One of the major issues that arise in creditors’ schemes of arrangement is the 
determination of what classes of creditors will be used to conduct the vote on a scheme 
proposal, which may be considered at the first court meeting to ensure that the scheme 
process is not wasted if classes are improperly drawn.102 The court will consider the 
overall fairness of the scheme at the final meeting however, and class composition can 
be addressed as part of this analysis by the court.103   
The classic explanation of how a class is to be determined in a creditors’ scheme 
was given by Bowen LJ in Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd:  
 
It seems plain that we must give such a meaning to the term ‘class’ as will 
prevent the section being so worked as to result in confiscation and injustice, 
and that it must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar 
as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their 
common interest.104 
 
The question of class composition is difficult because drawing the class too broadly 
could result in empowering the majority to oppress a minority that has different legal 
rights,105 while drawing the class definition too narrowly (and thereby allowing for a 
variety of classes) could enable a small minority to frustrate the wishes of the majority. 
As Lord Millett said in UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin: 
‘Fragmenting creditors into different classes gives each class the power to veto the 
Scheme and would deprive a beneficent procedure of much of its value.’ 106 
                                                 
102  Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 480 (applied in Australia by Re Opes Prime 
Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813; (2009) 179 FCR 20). 
103  Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813, [85]; (2009) 179 FCR 20; First 
Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116, [40]. 
104  [1892] 2 QB 573, 583. 
105  In Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813, [66]; (2009) 179 FCR 20, 
Finkelstein J noted that the second court hearing is a built-in protection against oppression. 
106  [2001] 3 HKLRD 634, [26]. See also Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813, 
[66]; (2009) 179 FCR 20 per Finkelstein J. 
   
 
 
In the Australian decision involving the collapse of a large securities firm Opes 
Prime, Justice Finkelstein explained: 
 
practical considerations are relevant. If a judge is too assiduous in identifying 
classes, it is possible to end up with any number of classes. In the end, schemes 
of arrangement are propounded in a business context. The judge should adopt 
a practical business-like approach to the issue, as would the creditors if they 
were to decide the matter. 107 
 
In UDL Lord Millett summarised the law as follows (at [27]): 
 
The following principles can be derived from this consistent line of authority: 
(1)  It is the responsibility of the company putting forward the Scheme to 
decide whether to summon a single meeting or more than one meeting. 
If the meeting or meetings are improperly constituted, objection 
should be taken on the application for sanction and the company bears 
the risk that the application will be dismissed. 
(2)  Persons whose rights are so dissimilar that they cannot sensibly 
consult together with a view to their common interest must be given 
separate meetings. Persons whose rights are sufficiently similar that 
they can consult together with a view to their common interest should 
be summoned to a single meeting. 
(3)  The test is based on similarity or dissimilarity of legal rights against 
the company, not on similarity or dissimilarity of interests not derived 
from such legal rights. The fact that individuals may hold divergent 
views based on their private interests not derived from their legal 
rights against the company is not a ground for calling separate 
meetings. 
(4)  The question is whether the rights which are to be released or varied 
under the Scheme or the new rights which the Scheme gives in their 
place are so different that the Scheme must be treated as a compromise 
or arrangement with more than one class. 
(5)  The Court has no jurisdiction to sanction a Scheme which does not 
have the approval of the requisite majority of creditors voting at 
meetings properly constituted in accordance with these principles. 
Even if it has jurisdiction to sanction a Scheme, however, the Court is 
not bound to do so. 
(6)  The Court will decline to sanction a Scheme unless it is satisfied, not 
only that the meetings were properly constituted and that the proposals 
were approved by the requisite majorities, but that the result of each 
meeting fairly reflected the views of the creditors concerned. To this 
end it may discount or disregard altogether the votes of those who, 
though entitled to vote at a meeting as a member of the class 
concerned, have such personal or special interests in supporting the 
proposals that their views cannot be regarded as fairly representative 
of the class in question. 
 
In Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd Finkelstein J held that: 
 
                                                 
107  Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2009] FCA 813, [66]; (2009) 179 FCR 20. 
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[66] The application of the relevant test involves a comparison of the rights 
creditors have in the absence of the scheme and any new rights that are 
established under the scheme[…] 
[71] […] the existence of separate commercial or other interests is not relevant 
to the class issue. This is not to suggest that different interests are irrelevant. 
The existence of different interests may be a factor that can be taken into 
account if the court comes to decide whether it should approve the schemes. 108 
 
A distinction is therefore drawn between the rights of creditors within the purported 
class and their interests.109 In Opes Prime, Finkelstein J held: 
 
the existence of separate commercial or other interests is not relevant to the 
class issue. This is not to suggest that different interests are irrelevant. The 
existence of different interests may be a factor that can be taken into account if 
the court comes to decide whether it should approve the schemes. 110 
 
The approach taken by Justice Finkelstein in Opes was applied on appeal, and has 
been subsequently applied in other decisions.111  
Examples of matters that have been held to be interests that do not affect rights, 
and hence did not require separate classes, include:  
 
 Creditors who will receive different interest rates or whose debts are 
repayable at different times;112 
 Creditors who were to be repaid in different currencies but under the 
scheme will be paid in a single currency;113 
 Participation of certain creditors in lock up arrangements that 
contractually oblige them to vote in favour of the scheme (with a 
fiduciary carve out);114 
 Creditors who receive nominal incentive fees to participate in a lock 
up agreement;115 
                                                 
108  [2009] FCA 813 applying Re T&N Ltd [2006] EWHC 1447 (Ch). 
109  See also Re Telewest Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924 (Ch). 
110  [2009] FCA 813, [71]. 
111  Fowler v Lindholm [2009] FCAFC 125; (2009) 178 FCR 563 (appeal from Opes 
dismissed); Re Nine Entertainment Group Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1464; (2012) 211 FCR 439; 
First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
112  Re McCarthy & Stone Plc [2009] EWHC 712 (Ch); Primacom Holdings GmbH v Credit 
Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch); Re NEF Telecom Co BV [2012] EWHC 2483; Cortefiel, SA v 
Mep 11.S.A.R.L. [2012] EWHC 2998 (Ch); First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd 
[2017] NSWCA 116. 
113  Re Telewest Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924; Re DX Holdings Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 1513. 
114  Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch), [54]; First 
Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
115  Re Telewest Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924; Re DX Holdings Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 1513; Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch); Re Seat 
Pagine Gaialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686 (Ch); Cortefiel, SA v Mep 11.S.A.R.L. [2012] EWHC 
2998 (Ch), [22]. 
   
 
 
 Participation of certain creditors in providing a new loan facility to the 
company;116 
 Rights given to certain creditors to appoint directors to the restructured 
company;117   
 The requirement that a group of lenders be required to waive a change 
of control default clause (in the context of the company otherwise 
being insolvent and the scheme proponent wanting majority control 
through a debt for equity swap in order to support the scheme);118 
 The fact that the scheme proponents were also shareholders and 
directors as well as being unsecured creditors did not require them to 
be placed in a separate class;119 
 The fact that only some creditors will receive new equity (in the 
context of only those creditors holding equity prior to the scheme);120 
 Intra-group creditors;121  
 Debenture holders who were also shareholders.122  
 
Scheme creditors who have different priority under the statute should be placed 
into a separate class to other creditors,123 particularly if their priority will be affected. If 
there are concerns about the ability of priority creditors to veto a scheme it is possible 
that the scheme will involve paying priority creditors (such as employees) in full and 
therefore their rights would not be affected and they need not be included in the scheme. 
For companies that would be clearly insolvent in the absence of the scheme it is possible 
that the priority creditors would receive no return in a liquidation (applying the Tea Corp 
principle)124 they need not be included in the scheme.125 However, given the priority that 
employee creditors have over circulating security interests126 it is advisable that 
employees are paid their statutory entitlements rather than be included in the scheme.  
 
D   Critique 
 
While it is clear that creditors or members whose legal rights are affected by a 
scheme must be included, the delineation between legal rights and commercial interests 
is not a bright line standard that can be easily applied in formulating creditors’ schemes. 
As all classes will need to approve of the scheme, this can lead to undue delays and 
                                                 
116  Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch); First Pacific 
Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
117  Re Nine Entertainment Group Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1464; (2012) 211 FCR 439; First 
Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
118  First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
119  Re Jax Marine Pty Ltd (1966) 85 WΝ (NSW) 130; First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart 
Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
120  First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
121  Re Landmark Finance Corp Ltd [1968] 1 NSWR 145 (applied in Re Telewest 
Communications Plc [2004] EWHC 924). 
122  Re Chevron (Sydney) Ltd [1963] VR 249; First Pacific Advisors LLC v Boart Longyear 
Ltd [2017] NSWCA 116. 
123  Re Brian Cassidy Electrical Industries Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 140; Re Richards & Co 
(1879) 11 Ch D 676. 
124  Re Tea Corp Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. 
125  Contrast Garry Hamilton, ‘Creditors and Classes of Creditors in the Context of 
Corporate Statutory Schemes of Arrangement’ (1994) 2 Insolvency Law Journal 176. 
126  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 433, 561. 
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further complexity where the majority of creditors in number and value can be subject 
to greenmailing by minority creditors. Furthermore, delays in seeking court permission 
to convene the creditors’ meeting while class composition issues are addressed leaves 
the debtor company vulnerable to enforcement action from creditors as there will be no 
stay against claims in place. Minority interests can be adequately protected by the need 
to secure court approval to implement a scheme even where the overwhelming majority 
of creditors vote in favour of it, in order to protect against oppression or fraud on a 
power.  
The threat of greenmail by minority creditors to hold up a restructuring using a 
scheme can lead to significant value leakage from the restructuring where the scheme 
proponents need to effectively pay off minority class creditors in order to secure their 
approval. A cross-class cram down mechanism could allow for court approval of the 
scheme even where one or more junior classes dissents, provided that they are treated 
fairly (for example by ensuring that they receive at least what they would in a liquidation 
of the company).  
Furthermore, the current law provides little protection of debt over equity, 
particularly where the company is not insolvent but is financially distressed and would 
benefit from a financial restructuring. While members who claim as creditors based on 
the circumstances concerning their shareholding (such as the decision to buy shares or 
the decision to sell or hold their shares) are subordinated under s 563A and s 411(5A) of 
the Corporations Act, members who do not claim creditor status are not subordinated. 
Thus, equity holders may argue that a scheme affects their legal rights and therefore they 
must be included within the scheme and given a vote.127 A common example where this 
will occur is in restructuring companies with stapled securities, such as real estate 
investment trusts.128 At present there is no version of the ‘absolute priority rule’ in 
relation to restructuring using a creditors’ scheme.129  
A cross-class cram down mechanism would offer a range of benefits to make 
creditors schemes a more efficient and attractive restructuring tool. First, it would 
discourage greenmailing by junior creditors as they could be bound by a scheme even if 
they voted against it provided the court approved it. Secondly, a cross-class cram down 
power would also reduce concerns about class composition. Currently, considerable 
effort is put into composing classes, often where dissenting creditors are sought by the 
scheme proponents to be included within a class of majority creditors supporting the 
scheme lest the multiplication of classes dooms the scheme. Alternatively, scheme 
proponents may seek to avoid including the dissenting creditors by relying on Tea 
Corp130 and arguing that the enterprise value has that class of creditors underwater which 
leads to complex financial arguments regarding the valuation of the entity for the 
purposes of determining where the break in the capital structure falls. Thirdly, a cross-
class cram down mechanism would assist with creditor concerns about value leakage to 
equity.   
The next section will show that while cross-class cram down is a well-known 
feature of the US Chapter 11 reorganisation procedure, it is a concept that is growing in 
popularity in both common law and non-common law jurisdictions through reforms 
introduced since the Global Financial Crisis.  
 
                                                 
127  For an argument that equity should be given a role in restructuring see: Stephan Madaus, 
‘Reconsidering the Shareholder’s Role in Corporate Reorganisations under Insolvency Law’ 
(2013) 22 International Insolvency Review 106. 
128  See Re Centro Properties Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1171; (2011) 87 ACSR 131. 
129  The absolute priority rule is a US bankruptcy concept that is discussed further below. 
130  Re Tea Corp Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. 
   
 
 
 
 
V   CROSS-CLASS CRAM DOWN MECHANISMS 
 
A   Operation of cram down in the United States 
 
The concept of cram down in the United States refers to the power of the court to 
confirm a reorganization plan under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code where the plan 
has not been accepted by the requisite majority for each relevant class.131 The 
Bankruptcy Code requires plans under Chapter 11 to be accepted by each class of 
impaired claimants.132 An impaired class is, broadly speaking, one whose creditors or 
interest holders will have their rights varied by the plan.133 A failure to provide full 
payment is a variation of rights for this purpose. A class that is not impaired does not 
need to vote as they are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan.134 Similarly, 
a class that is to receive nothing under the plan is deemed to have rejected the plan.135 
An impaired class of creditors can accept the plan by a majority vote in number and 
2/3rds in value for that that class.136  
The court is required to confirm a plan under Chapter 11 where certain conditions 
are met, such as compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, the plan proponent acting in 
good faith, and the requisite voting requirements have been met for all impaired 
classes.137 The plan must also not be likely to be followed by liquidation, unless that is 
expressly stated in the plan.138 The Code also requires a comparison with returns in 
liquidation (which occurs under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code) so that all impaired 
classes must receive not less than the amount that they would receive in liquidation. An 
impaired class that accepts the plan is not subject to the same requirement.139  
In order for cram down to operate, there must be at least one impaired class that 
has accepted the plan, without including acceptances from insiders.140 The court may 
confirm the plan where all of the requirements of §1129(a) have been satisfied except 
the requirement for acceptance by all impaired classes, and the plan does not 
discriminate unfairly,141 and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or 
interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.142 The court is required 
                                                 
131  11 USC §1129(b). 
132  11 USC §1129(a)(8). 
133  11 USC §1124. 
134  11 USC §§1126(f), 1129(a)(8)(B). 
135  11 USC §1126(g). 
136  11 USC §1126(c). The court has the power to exclude particular creditors from the 
calculation under §1126(e). 
137  11 USC §1129(a). 
138  11 USC §1129(a)(11). 
139  11 USC §1129(a)(7). 
140  11 USC §1129(a)(10). 
141  See In re Dura Automotive Systems Inc (2007) 379 BR 257 (Bankr D Del). The standard 
for assessing unfair discrimination is whether dissenting classes will receive value equal to the 
value given to all other similarly situated classes, that is those who hold similar legal claims: In re 
Trenton Ridge Investors LLC (2011) 461 BR 440 (Bankr SD Ohio). The comparison is between 
classes that reject the plan, an impaired class that rejects the plan but receives better treatment than 
an impaired class that accepts the plan is not unfairly discriminated against: In re Sentinel 
Management Group Inc (2008) 398 BR 281 (Bankr ND Ill).  
142  11 USC §1129(b)(1). 
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to determine whether the requirements have been met and cannot rely merely on a lack 
of formal objections from class members.143 
Establishing that a plan is fair and equitable with respect to a class requires that: 
 
 Secured creditors’ security over collateral is protected,144 or that the 
security attaches to proceeds of a sale of the collateral145 or they 
receive ‘the indubitable equivalent’ of their claims;146 
 Unsecured creditors either receive of their admitted claims, or that any 
junior classes of creditors or interests not receive any property, which 
is known as the absolute priority rule.147  
 The majority of applications for cram down involve secured creditor 
class dissent.148  
 
The next section shows that cross-class cram down mechanisms are becoming 
increasingly popular in modern restructuring laws. 
 
B   Law reform in other common law jurisdictions 
 
Common law countries usually have a creditors’ scheme of arrangement procedure 
which is based on the English scheme provisions. As the English scheme provisions do 
not provide for cross-class cram down,149 neither do the provisions in other common law 
countries, such as Hong Kong,150 Bermuda,151 Ireland,152 Malaysia,153 or Nigeria.154 
Other common law countries that have formal debt restructuring mechanisms such as 
Canada,155 South Africa156 and New Zealand157 also do not provide for cross-class cram 
down. However, with many jurisdictions actively seeking more restructuring work from 
both domestic and international companies, and the increasingly international flow of 
funds for restructuring efforts, this traditional refusal to allow for cross-class cram down 
may be changing.  
Singapore has recently enacted major insolvency and restructuring reforms in order 
                                                 
143  See In re Lett (2011) 632 F.3d 1216 (USCA 11th Cir). 
144  11 USC §1129(b)(2)(A)(i). See further Jack Friedman, ‘What Courts Do to Secured 
Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram Down’ (1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 1495; Westlaw, Chapter 11 
Reorganization (2nd ed, February 2017) §14.17-§14.20. 
145  11 USC §1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
146  11 USC §1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). See further Westlaw, Chapter 11 Reorganization (2nd ed, 
February 2017) §14.23.  
147  See further Stephen Lubben, ‘The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule’ (2016) 21 
Fordham Journal of Corporate and Finance Law 581. 
148  River Road Hotel Partners LLC v Amalgamated Bank (2011) 651 F.3d 642, 647-8 
(USCA 7th Cir). 
149  Companies Act 2006 (UK) Part 26. 
150  Companies Ordinance 2012 (HK) (Cap 622) Part 13. 
151  Companies Act 1981 (Bermuda) s 99. 
152  Companies Act 2014 (Ireland) s 453. 
153  Companies Act 2016 (Malaysia) s 366. 
154  Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (Nigeria) s 539. 
155  Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act 1986 (RSC). 
156  Companies Act 2008 (SA) Ch 6 (Business Rescue and Compromises with Creditors).  
157  Companies Act 1993 (NZ) Pts 14 (Compromises with Creditors) and 15 (Approval of 
Arrangements, Amalgamations and Compromises by Court). 
   
 
 
to establish itself as a global and regional restructuring hub. On 10 March 2017, the 
Singaporean parliament passed the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2017. These reforms 
will alter the creditors’ scheme provisions in Singapore in order to make them more 
attractive as a debt restructuring tool, including introducing a moratorium for schemes, 
allowing for pre-pack schemes to be approved without creditor meetings, protection for 
interim financing and providing for cross-class cram down.158 
The Singaporean cram down mechanism is modelled closely on the US Chapter 11 
model in §1129.159 The new provision requires that at least one class of creditors has 
approved of the scheme proposal by a majority in number and ¾ in value for creditors 
voting in person or by proxy in that class.160 Where at least one class does not approve 
the scheme proposal then the court may still sanction the scheme and make the scheme 
binding on the classes covered by it, where the requirements of the new s 211H are 
satisfied. Those requirements are:161 
 
 The majority in number and ¾ in value requirements are satisfied for 
the creditors as a whole, for those who voted in person or by proxy; 
 The court is satisfied that the scheme does not discriminate unfairly 
between 2 or more classes of creditors; and 
 The court is satisfied that the scheme is fair and equitable to each 
dissenting class. 
 
A scheme that pays less than a liquidation will not be fair and equitable to a 
dissenting class.162 Section 211H also adopts the measure of protection for secured 
creditors that is contained in §1129(b)(2)(A) of the US Chapter 11 procedure.163 The 
reforms also allow for an expert to be appointed to assist the court with valuations.164 
An application for cram down may be made by the company or a creditor (with leave of 
the court).165 
In England, the Insolvency Service has also proposed a cross-class cram down 
mechanism. In May 2016, the Insolvency Service released a discussion paper ‘A Review 
of the Corporate Insolvency Framework’,166 which included a proposal for a ‘flexible 
restructuring plan’ that would introduce a cross-class cram down on junior creditors. The 
junior creditor classes subject to cram down would need to be paid at least what they 
would recover in liquidation. The Discussion Paper noted that such a mechanism could 
offer efficiency benefits over the current procedure to deal with junior creditors through 
                                                 
158  See the detailed review by Herbert Smith Freehills, Guide to Restructuring, Turnaround 
and Insolvency in Asia Pacific 2016 (2016), <www.hsf.com.au>.  
159  See new s 211H in the Companies Act 1967 (SG) (Chapter 50). 
160  See Companies Act 1967 (SG) s 210(3AB). 
161  Companies Act 1967 (SG) s 211H(3). 
162  Companies Act 1967 (SG) s 211H(4)(a). 
163  This provides that secured creditors are entitled to retain their liens and receive deferred 
cash payments for the value of the claim at the date of plan or that they receive consideration that 
is the ‘indubitable equivalent’ of such claims. See Westlaw, Chapter 11 Reorganization (2nd ed, 
February 2017) §14.17-§14.20. One significant difference is that the absolute priority rule, which 
is not a Singaporean principle, is narrowed so that only junior creditors must not receive any 
payment before senior creditors. Equity holders are not mentioned in s 211H(4)(b)(ii)(B).  
164  Companies Act 1967 (SG) s 211H(5). 
165  Companies Act 1967 (SG) s 211H(2). 
166 <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-insolvency-
framework>.  
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the use of transfer schemes, leaving the junior creditors in the former entity.167 The 
Discussion Paper also notes that cram down would address concerns about greenmailing 
by junior creditor classes.168  
This proposal would introduce a new multi-class restructuring procedure to aid 
corporate rescue that would work in addition to schemes of arrangement. Debtors would 
propose class compositions to the court when seeking to invoke the procedure, and the 
court could reject the proposed classes by applying the Sovereign Life test.169 The court 
would also need to approve the plan and could only do so where it would leave creditors 
no worse off than liquidation. In September 2016, the Insolvency Service released the 
Government’s feedback on submissions made regarding the Discussion Paper. Of 
submissions that addressed cram-down, sixty one percent supported it.170 Submissions 
also recommended that the proposal be expanded to include shareholders.171 At the time 
of writing no further announcement had been made regarding the implementation of 
these proposed reforms, with the English civil service occupied with managing Britain’s 
exit from the European Union.  
 
C   Cram down in non-common law countries 
 
This section provides a brief overview of cram down mechanisms applying non-
common law restructuring mechanisms. An extended examination of these jurisdictions 
is outside of the scope of this article.   
China introduced a cross-class cram down mechanism in Articles 86 and 87 of its 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 2006.172 Japan also allows for cram down in its corporate 
reorganization proceedings through a court order confirming the reorganization plan.173 
There has also been discussion of the possibility of extending cross-class cram into the 
‘alternate dispute resolution’ for business turnaround (or revitalization) procedure.  
Looking to Europe, Italy in 2009 introduced a new ‘pre-bankruptcy agreement’ 
procedure, which is court supervised and allows for a majority of creditors classes 
(which can include both secured and unsecured) to bind the minority classes with court 
approval. The numbers of European countries with cross-class cram down mechanisms 
in their restructuring laws is likely to increase in the near future.174 The European 
                                                 
167  Discussion Paper at [9.9].  
168  Discussion Paper at [9.13]. 
169 See above n 104. 
170  Response Paper at [4.5]. 
171  Response Paper at [4.6]. 
172  See Zuofa Wang, ‘The Political Economy of the Implementation of the Bankruptcy Law 
of China’ (2015) 6 Asian Journal of Law and Economics 249; Emily Lee, ‘China’s New Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law: A Great Leap Forward, But Just How Far? (2010) 19 International Insolvency 
Review 145.   
173  Corporate Reorganization Act 2002 (Japan) Art 200(1). See further, Samuel Bufford 
and Kazuhiro Yanagida, ‘Japan’s Revised Laws on Business Reorganization: An Analysis’ (2006) 
39 Cornell International Law Journal 1; Stacie Steel, ‘Insolvency Law in Japan’ in Roman 
Tomasic (ed), Insolvency Law in East Asia (2006) Ch 2; Shinjiro Takagi, ‘Restructuring in Japan’ 
(2003) 12 International Insolvency Review 1.  
174  Germany permits cram down for restructuring certain financial institutions: see  
Kreditinstute-Reorganisationsgezetz, as explained in Tomas Arons, ‘Recognition of Debt 
Restructuring and Resolution Measures under the European Union Regulatory Framework’ (2014) 
23 International Insolvency Review 57. 
   
 
 
Commission released a proposed directive on 22 November 2016,175 which recommends 
that member states introduce a cross-class cram down mechanism, provided that at least 
one class of creditors approves of the reorganization plan, and the absolute priority rule 
is complied with.176 The plan must also be approved by a majority of creditors, whose 
debts must make up at least 75% of the value of debts owed by the debtor.177 As the 
European Commission’s recommendation has only been released recently it has not been 
specifically actioned by any EU member state at the time of writing. It is likely though 
that it will be implemented by member states in the future and this will put further 
pressure on England to introduce a cross-class cram down at some point in the future if 
it wishes to retain its prominent place as an international restructuring hub.  
There has been extensive debate concerning a proposal to introduce a Dutch 
scheme of arrangement procedure, which is likely to include a cross-class cram down, 
based on the draft bill.178 The current draft bill was released in 2014, which pre-dates the 
EC recommendation and at the time of writing had not been updated in response to the 
recommendation. 
 
 
VI   DOES AUSTRALIA NEED A CROSS-CLASS CRAM DOWN MECHANISM? 
 
Cross-class cram down is a restructuring tool whose time has come, and should be 
introduced into Australian law. While creditors’ schemes of arrangement rely upon a 
procedure that is derived from traditional English insolvency law dating back to the 
1860s, the times have changed, as have businesses and forms of financing both for 
business operations and for funding corporate restructuring. England has raised the 
prospects of introducing cross-class cram down and will likely follow European Union 
member states in doing so in order to keep its place as a global restructuring hub. 
Singapore is aggressively seeking to further develop itself as a restructuring hub in Asia.  
As more jurisdictions introduce reforms to facilitate financial restructuring, it is 
likely that cross-class cram down mechanisms will become accepted as an important 
feature of modern restructuring legal frameworks. The value of cross-class cram down 
mechanisms is recognized in the European Commission’s draft recommendation on 
business rescue and has been recognized in other forums.179  
Australian laws and the Australian judicial system are widely respected around the 
world. Our financial system and expertise in managing financial transactions is also 
widely respected. Many Australian financiers, lawyers, accountants and other 
restructuring professionals have experience working overseas and are widely sought 
                                                 
175  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the 
Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending Directive 
2012/30/EU, COM/2016/0723 final - 2016/0359 (COD).  
176  The absolute priority rule requires that dissenting classes of creditors receive full 
repayment before any junior creditor classes or equity classes receive payment under the plan.  
177  Article 9, Article 10(2).  
178  See proposed Article 373(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1896 (NL) (‘extra-judicial 
composition’); Jochem Hummelen, ‘A response to the financial crisis: recalibration of bankruptcy 
law’ (2014) 11 International Corporate Rescue 297. An unofficial English translation of the Bill 
is available from <http://www.debrauw.com/draft-bill/#>.  
179  See for example, the report by AFME, Frontier Economics and Weil, Potential 
economic gains from reforming insolvency law in Europe, February 2016, p5; World Bank, 
Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Rights Systems (2015), Principle C.14 
(recommending court approval of a reorganization plan based on majority voting). 
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after in the global employment market. However, expertise can only go so far in 
maintaining an efficient insolvency and restructuring framework. The law needs to meet 
the expectations of international investors and give them confidence to invest in local 
restructuring efforts.  
Australia needs to recognize that it is involved in a global market place for 
restructuring capital. By relying on procedures that date back to the 1800s as a major 
restructuring tool we risk falling behind, not only the leading restructuring hubs of New 
York and London, but falling behind European member states and those in our own 
region: China, Japan and Singapore, all of which have cross-class cram down 
mechanisms. Australia needs to add such a tool to our legal framework to support 
restructuring efforts, particularly given the increasingly prominent role that foreign 
distressed debt and special situation funds play in major restructurings. Recent large 
scale restructurings in Centro, Nine Entertainment, Fitness First, Billabong, Boart 
Longyear, Atlas Iron, Mirabela Nickel, Emeco, and Boart Longyear all involved 
offshore specialist funds in leading roles during the restructuring. These investors come 
from jurisdictions (particularly from the US) that use cram down to provide corporate 
rescue and restructuring. Introducing a cross-class cram down mechanism in Australia 
will help bring our law into line with international standards and will facilitate the 
restructuring and rescuing of distressed companies using creditors’ schemes of 
arrangement.  
In advocating for the introduction of a cross-class cram down mechanism in 
Australian law it is recognized that the rights of those crammed down also need 
consideration and need to be treated fairly. This can be achieved by following the 
example set by overseas jurisdictions such as Singapore and the United States. However, 
it is not recommended that Australian follow the lead of Singapore and largely adopt the 
US provisions, which have their own historical features that fit within their legal and 
administrative framework. For example, Singapore’s adoption of the ‘indubitable 
equivalent’ standard for protection of secured creditors could be highly problematic to 
implement given the lack of consistency in the United States bankruptcy court system 
as to what will be sufficient to meet that standard.  
First, it is important that the priority of secured debt over unsecured debt be 
recognized and that the property rights of secured creditors (as distinct from their rights 
in personam under their debt contracts) not be confiscated without adequate 
compensation. It is recommended that any cross-class cram down mechanism adopt a 
form of absolute priority rule whereby secured creditors must be paid before junior 
unsecured creditors or equity are paid, which would need to fit within the existing 
priority regime given to employee entitlements under the Corporations Act s 433 and s 
561. The absolute priority rule would be applied throughout the capital structure so that 
mezzanine lenders would be paid prior to general unsecured creditors and equity and so 
forth. However, the absolute priority rule could be set as a relevant consideration for the 
court to consider, to leave open the possibility that an effective restructuring may need 
to pay junior creditors such as essential suppliers or equity in order to promote a 
successful enterprise going forward. Of course, it would still be possible to exclude 
certain categories of creditors or equity where their legal rights are not affected by 
applying the Tea Corp.180  
Second, creditors under a cram down reorganization plan must be paid at least the 
equivalent of what they would receive in a likely liquidation of the company. This is 
consistent with the assessment of fairness of deeds of company arrangement that may 
                                                 
180  Re Tea Corp Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. 
   
 
 
follow a period of voluntary administration by the court on applications to terminate the 
deed because of unfair prejudice.181 
Third, cram down should only be available by court order, not by the mere majority 
vote of the creditors. Furthermore, the court should only order cram down where the 
class votes represent a majority in favour of the scheme overall (across all classes), being 
a majority that is at least 75% of the value of the debts and claims owed. The court 
should retain the discretion that it currently has under s 411(4) of the Corporations Act, 
which is to ensure that: 
 
a) the terms of the statute have been complied with in conducting the 
creditor meetings; 
b) the classes were fairly represented by those who attended the meeting 
and that the majority were acting bona fide and not oppressing the 
minority; and 
c) the arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest person, if a 
member of the class concerned and acting within their interests, might 
reasonably approve.  
 
By giving affected creditors the opportunity to oppose the scheme at the second 
court hearing (which is currently permitted), this provides an important safety net to 
ensure that the cram down is not unfairly prejudicial or oppressive.  
In the near future, cross-class cram downs could form part of restructuring laws 
around the globe: from the United States to England, much of Europe and stretching into 
the Asia Pacific region in Singapore, China and Japan. It is important for Australia’s 
restructuring laws to meet international best practice to ensure that we remain an 
attractive destination for the global flow of funds for restructuring deal flow. A cross-
class cram down should be introduced into Australian law.  
 
 
VII   CONCLUSION 
 
This article has argued that the current requirement to place creditors in separate 
classes for voting on schemes of arrangement can create inefficiencies and increase costs 
and complexity due to the requirement that each class approve the scheme. Changes in 
the secondary debt marks in Australia and the increasing role of hedge funds and debt 
traders buying up secured debt in Australian distressed companies creates fragmentation 
of lending groups which makes obtaining the necessary majority difficult as stakeholders 
jockey for leverage to extract maximum value. Debt trading poses risks for effective 
restructuring because debt traders may have little interest in saving a business rather than 
simply extracting their financial margin by being bought out. As noted above, some may 
even actively work against a successful restructuring due to their holdings of credit 
default swaps which pay out on liquidation.  
The current law allows for greenmailing to occur where debt traders buy up 
strategic blocking stakes in a company’s debt stack in order to pressure restructuring 
leaders to pay them off in order to secure approval of the scheme, even where the 
overwhelming majority of creditors support the scheme. This is a problem in many 
developed economies seeking to promote effective and efficient corporate restructuring 
and rescue laws and to minimize losing viable businesses to liquidation. Many foreign 
legal systems address the problem of greenmailing during restructuring by providing a 
                                                 
181  See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 445D. 
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cross-class cram down mechanism, usually by way of court order, provided that the 
majority of creditors support the restructuring proposal. While US bankruptcy law is 
perceived to lead the way on cram down mechanisms for restructuring, this article has 
shown that cross-class cram down mechanisms exist in many jurisdictions across Asia 
and are likely to become more common in Europe. Even the UK, whose laws provide 
the foundation for Australia’s scheme laws, has suggested cross-class cram down may 
be introduced. In the author’s view, class difficulties experienced in recent restructurings 
such as Nine Entertainment, Emeco, and Boart Longyear are a sign of things to come. If 
Australia wants to remain competitive as a destination for debt restructuring capital we 
must ensure that our laws provide an effective and efficient framework to support 
restructuring and a cross-class cram down mechanism would be a useful addition to our 
scheme of arrangement procedure. 
